A dynamic model of financial markets with learning is demonstrated to produce a selforganized system that displays critical behavior. The price contains private information that traders learn to extract and employ to forecast future value. Since the price reflects the beliefs of the traders, the learning process is self-referencing. As the market learns to correctly extract information from the price, the market deemphasizes private information. Despite the convergence of the model towards the parameters producing efficiency, pricing deviations remain constant due to the increased sensitivity of the price to small errors in information extraction produced by the model's own convergence.
Introduction
When Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) find that no equilibrium exists able to produce efficient markets under rational expectations, they create one by introducing a second source of noise that hampers information extraction from the price. The equilibrium is created at the expense of market efficiency. Finding the conditions sufficient to create equilibrium is, of course, the traditional thrust of economic research. This paper explores a dynamic model of information extraction for which no equilibrium exists. Analytical analysis and simulation characterize the asymptotic behavior of a market in which an informationally efficient price is an unachievable attractor to the system. Despite the attraction and continuous improvement in information extraction, the market price does not converge towards the efficient market price.
A fully revealing efficient price is impossible in a rational expectations equilibrium. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) (hereafter GS) reach this conclusion based on a market in which fundamental information is costly to obtain. They find that traders who are informed with private information have an impact on the price. Uninformed traders use the price to costlessly extract the private information. The GS paradox is that a "long run" equilibrium does not exist.
No trader wants to bear the cost of informing the market without reward. Subsequent papers reach the same conclusion after relaxing the assumption of full rationality, for example by replacing rationality with dynamic learning on the part of the uninformed traders.
1 This paper further generalizes the GS model by examining dynamic populations in concert with a dynamic learning process.
Among those papers extending GS is Bray (1982) which introduced learning through repeated realizations of the GS single period model. Bray provides support for the GS assumption of full rationality by finding that learning converges to the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) for any fixed population proportion of uninformed to informed traders. Hussman (1992) and Timmermann (1996) also examine learning in a financial market setting.
Like Bray, they have a static population of traders, but with a multi-period asset paying a dividend that follows an AR(1) process. Routledge (1999) examines a dynamic population in a noisy GS model. With two types of traders, a dynamic population process is introduced by allowing traders to switch strategies based on imitating the strategy of the more successful traders they encounter. Thus, the single act of imitation embodies the two dynamic processes of learning and population evolution. Modeled with a random supply of the risky asset, the exogenous noise ensures the existence of a stable REE. The process generally converges to this REE. Bak, Tang, and Weisenfeld (1988) introduce the notion of self-organized criticality (SOC) by describing what has become the canonical example of a system that attains SOC, the sand pile. The slope of the sand pile increases as grains of sand are added. At the critical slope an additional grain of sand causes an avalanche which locally reduces the slope and temporarily returns the system to stability. The size of the avalanche is determined by local conditions. The distribution of the avalanche size follows a power law. The self-organization refers to the natural convergence of the system to the attracting critical slope. The criticality refers to the chaotic behavior of the avalanches near the critical slope. A number of papers have applied the notion of SOC to economic settings, including Bak et al (1992) , Bak, Paczuski, and Shubik (1997) , Berg et al (2001) , and Challet and Marsili (2002) . The latter three describe financial markets as SOC. Goldbaum (2005) separates the learning process from the population process in an examination of a market in which dividends follow a random walk. The model produces self-organized criticality with the market attracted to a critical division in the population separating a stable region of the state space from an unstable region. The system naturally oscillates between the two states producing critical behavior. The market never approaches total adoption of market based analysis as the critical population requires a non-zero mass of informed traders. The market presented in this paper also contains a phase transition, but between the two more traditional stable states of an informed market or an uninformed market. It is the convergence towards the complete abandonment of the fundamental information, without any actual switching between states, that produces the interesting market behavior. The convergence properties under learning as discussed by Sargent (1989a, 1989b) are keenly relevant.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of the market. The population is divided into those who are informed with private fundamental information and those who attempt to extract information from the price. The nature of the private information is developed along with the trading strategy of those who obtain it. The method by which traders learn to extract information from the price is also described in this section. Section 3 presents analysis of the model under learning and introduces the dynamic population process. Simulation results characterize the model's asymptotic behavior, displaying the critical behavior produced by the model's self-organizing aspect. The model developed in Section 4 removes the artificial population division, allowing all traders to both receive private information and extract information from the price. This model is also examined through simulation. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5 of the paper.
Model
The market setting is similar to Goldbaum (2005) with the modification that the dividend follows an AR(1) process rather than a random walk. This small change produces substantially different market behavior. The following provides a basic description of the environment and solutions based on the stationary dividend process.
The market
A large but finite number of agents, indexed by i = 1, ..., N, trade a risky asset and a riskfree bond. The risk-free bond, with a price of one, pays R. The risky asset is purchased at the market determined price, p t , in period t. In t+1, it pays a stochastic dividend d t+1 , and sells for the ex dividend market determined price p t+1 . The market participants are aware that the stochastic dividend follows a commonly known AR(1) process centered around d 0 :
(1)
indicating the conditional variance.
The parameter γ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. In each period, each myopic trader maximizes a negative exponential utility function on one period ahead wealth conditional on his individual information set (to be developed below). This produces the demand for the risky asset,
Assume K strategies for estimating payoffs, 1 + t z . In a Walrasian equilibrium, the market price equates supply and demand for the asset. Supply is fixed to avoid the exogenous introduction of noise. For convenience, set fixed net supply of the risky asset to zero. Let N k be the total number of traders employing information 
, be the proportion of the trader population employing strategy k,
. The price p t clears the market by solving
Information

The fundamental trader
The estimate of the future payoff is in the nature of Hellwig (1980 A linear projection of η t+1 onto the information set produces the fundamental investor's mean squared error minimizing forecast
where the weight β is known based on the traders' knowledge of the dividend and information processes,
The "fundamental" price prevails in a market populated exclusively by fundamental investors. Derive the fundamental price by using the estimate (5) in (2),
. Price is a function of the current private and public information.
Advancing (6) one period, substituting it into the demand (2) and using the market clearing condition (3), the price coefficients solve to There is not a time independent value for the price at the fixed point.
For large N, the impact of the idiosyncratic signal noise on the price is negligible. Assume a sufficiently large N such that the t ν term can be dropped.
. As the private signal becomes increasingly noisy, the price converges to reflect just the public information contained in d t , i.e. the price is Semistrong-form efficient according to the Fama (1970) 
. When traders receive a perfect noise-free signal on the next period's dividend, the price fully reflects the d t+1 based value producing a Strong-form efficient price. Between the two extremes of signal accuracy, Fundamental traders rely on (6) in forming demand. Plug (6) back into (2) to solve for the average demand of the group of fundamental traders,
2 Formally, ν t is o(1).
Regression traders
The regression traders model the relationship between the payoff,
, and current market observables. The traders appropriately estimate
The traders employ least-squares learning to update the parameters of their model. The learning process is self-referential with an endogenous state variable, p t-1 , included as a regressor. The value of c 0 is exogenous to beliefs and can be derived analytically by the traders given their knowledge of the dividend process. Thus traders impose the correct value of c 0 . Let
The regression traders update the coefficients, c t = [c 0 c 1t c 2t ], using the standard recursive updating algorithm for least-squares learning of Sargent (1989a, 1989b) :
given (c 0 , Q 0 ). The regression traders all rely on the same public information, and thus all employ the same forecast,
. Per capita demand among regression traders is thus
Price Formation
With K = 2, let n t = F t n , and thus (1-
Use (7), (10), and (11) to solve for the market clearing price. A consistent price function takes the form
with
, and
.
Analysis and simulation
Learning under fixed n
Consider just the learning process by fixing n t = n. A fixed point to the learning process given n is established. Based on this solution, the implicit evolution in the population can be developed and examined before resorting to simulations.
A fixed point solution
Three equations describe the dynamic processes under a fixed n. Equation (1) is the exogenous dividend process. Equation (12) is the endogenous price equation. The coefficients of (12) depend on the beliefs of the regression traders as captured by (8) that evolve according to (9) and upon the fixed proportion of the market relying on fundamental analysis.
The fixed point for the learning process produces a fixed point pricing function ) ( * n p t based on the solution, for 0 < n ≤ 1: Regardless of n,
This result ensures that the fundamental trader's demand is unaffected by n. Equation (7), derived based on n = 1, is correct for the mixed population setting as well, substantiating the use of (7) in deriving the market equilibrium solution.
The solution described by (14) through (16) is implicitly defined since ) ( [ Figure 1 about here]
At the fixed point the regression traders correctly deduce the relationship between price and payoff. This is equivalent to knowing the value of d t+1 . Essentially, at the fixed point the regression traders know the values of the price coefficients in (12) 
Since
, the first term of (17) 
Performance
Let the measure of profits earned by each information source be the excess return realized for the risky asset multiplied by the group average demand:
Based on the fixed point solution, the modeler with knowledge of n can compute
Thus, for all values of n > 0, the fixed point expected profits are positive for the regression traders and weakly negative for fundamental traders. The regression traders outperform the fundamental traders because with a correct model of the relationship between price and payoff, the price is a better source of information, revealing d t+1 , than is the noisy signal.
A discrete jump in profits occurs at n = 0, reflecting the benefits to even noisy information on η t+1 , when the price reflects only the public time t information. There is no value of n at which ) ( ) (
Evolution in the population
Allow for dynamics in the population proportion. The Replicator Dynamic model of population evolution produces an dynamic population in which the dominant strategy attracts converts from the inferior strategy. The two choice version of the more general K choice replicator dynamic model found in Branch and McGough (2003) results in the transition 
a choice that ensures 0 < n t < 1 for bounded
Re t
Fe t π − π . Thus, by construction, the discontinuity of n = 0 will never be realized in the simulation. The parameter δ determines how responsive the population is to differences in expected profits.
From (19), given c t = c * (n t ) there is no value of n t that produced equal profits, thus there is no joint fixed point to both the learning and population processes. Without the assumption c t = c * (n t ), the learning and the population processes must evolve together. In Figure 2 , the 3-dimentional phase space in n t , c 1t , and c 2t has been collapsed to two dimensions by setting c 2t to be consistent with the c 1t parameter, a feat accomplished by replacing ) ( * 1 n c in the ) ( * 2 n c solution of (15) with t c 1 . In the phase space plotted in Figure 2 , the learning process updates the regression coefficients and thus moves the model vertically in the phase space. The population process creates an evolution in n t and thus moves the model horizontally. The curve labeled " c " in the second row of Figure 1 ). At t c 1 = 1 c , the regression traders' strong positive response to a price increase creates an upward sloping demand curve. The curve thus represents an n dependent upper bound on the value of t c 1 . By (2) demand is attenuated by large estimates in the conditional variance. The regression traders estimate the conditional variance based on the mean squared regression error.
Including the current period's price in the regression traders' current estimate of the conditional variance allows the model parameters to exist above 1 c but still produce finite market prices.
Analysis of the phase space suggests a convergence path between the curves [ Figure 2 about here]
Simulations
Simulations are necessary to determine convergence properties when allowing for the interaction between the learning and population processes. , the latter producing a large jump in n t . As t increases, the single period innovations in c t ,
Fe t π , and
Re t π become small. Figure 4 demonstrates that a large δ introduce cycles into the convergence without undermining the fact of the convergence.
[ Figure 4 about here]
The declining cycles seen in Figure 4 (and more pronounced in Figure 6 ) results from the evolution in n t outpacing the evolution in the regression coefficients. The higher δ = 1 setting produces greater responsiveness in the trader population to differences in performance. Profits earned by the accuracy of the regression equation cause n t to drop, but at a rate faster than the regression coefficients can keep pace. When n t becomes too low for the contemporaneous regression parameters, the pricing error allows the fundamental traders to profit, temporarily reversing the progress in n t .
For both δ = 0.01 and δ = 1 the system shows convergence towards n t = 0. Figures 5 and 6 display the parameter values from the same simulation during the t = 1.5x10 6 to t = 2.0x10 6 interval. The most striking characteristic is that despite the continued convergence of the population and learning processes toward values that analytically produce greater efficient markets, the price and the price coefficients do not seem to reflect this advancement.
[ Figure 5 about here]
[ Figure 6 about here]
The convergence in both the learning and population parameters under the two values of δ demonstrates that the self-organization of the market is the interplay between learning, profits, and the population. Early in the simulation the regression coefficients quickly converged to reflect the concurrent value of n t . In (17), errors in beliefs by the regression traders cause the first term to deviate from zero, but for large n t , the second term dominates, becoming the determining factor for the failure of market efficiency. The accuracy of regression produces ) (
, but the regression traders' market impact remains low so that ) (
The accuracy of the regression trader beliefs produce superior performance, driving n t towards zero and ) (
is approximately
zero and yet the simulation produces a price consistently different from (17) is zero. Once n t is sufficiently small, deviation in b 2t from ) (
becomes a greater source of error in
and n t towards zero does not noticeably improve the market efficiency.
Intuition might lead one to believe that continued learning by the regression traders would increase the efficiency of the price. Two explanations for why this is not the case deserve discussion. The convergence of ) ( * t t n c c → produces progression in n t towards zero. This changes the target for t c in the learning process, impeding further model improvement.
Improvement occurs nonetheless and thus this endogenously produced error in learning is not the underlying cause of the failure to observe p t → EM t p . The decreasing n t also produces instability by increasing the need for accuracy on the part of the regression traders. From (14), assuming
. Thus, as n t → 0,
Without the assumption of ) (
, an examination of (13) reveals that both the numerator efficiency. The stability of the distribution of the pricing error despite the improving regression trader model is consistent with the GS finding that information content of the price is unaffected by the variance of their model's exogenous noise.
Complete Information
Learning
In this section traders are allowed to employ both the public price and the private signal in determining a forecast of the value of the risky security. Traders are modeled as learning agents individually estimating the relationship
Let c it = [c 0 c 1it c 2it c 3it ] be the estimated individual regression coefficients, where
The equilibrium price solution that sets ∑ i it q = 0 takes the same linear structure as in (12),
but with
All traders share the same time consistent beliefs at the fixed point. The fixed point for the learning process produces the regression coefficients
The price and the price coefficients are indeterminate at the fixed point,
As the system approaches the fixed point, traders are able to rely heavily on the price for information on the value of d t+1 . They place positive, but negligible, weight on their noisy private signal since the price is an almost perfect indicator of d t+1 .
At the fixed point, both price and private information are removed from the agents' demand function in (25) and demand for the risky asset becomes zero. The No Trade solution is attained.
The price is removed because the traders believe the market has converged to the point at which p t fully reveals d t+1 , removing the ability of the price to reveal profitable trades. At the same time, the noisy private information is completely dominated by p t , and thus receives zero weight.
In a GS type paradox, the reality of the fixed point is just the opposite of the traders' belief. The price contains no information, both because no one trades based on the d t+1 information and because any price clears the market.
Simulations
Simulations produce market behavior much like that produced by the Replicator Dynamics.
The typical progression can be seen in Figures [ Figure 7 about here]
Conclusion
The analysis explores a dynamic financial market model that lacks a fixed point. The unattainable point of attraction is market efficiency in which the price fully reflects the aggregate of private information. Though the market is constructed to preclude the existence of an equilibrium with an efficient price, this absence is not the driving force behind the failure to achieve market efficiency. The failure to produce an efficient price is the result of the interaction between the two dynamic processes, accuracy of the model extracting information from the price and the extent to which the market relies on this model to set the price. Improvement in the ability to extract information from the price elicits greater reliance on market-based information by the traders. As the population of traders decreases its dependence on the fundamental information the tolerance for error in the perceived model also declines. As the traders become increasingly accurate in their extraction of information from the price the market requires an increasingly accurate model.
The rate at which the traders' pricing model improves and the rate of increasing reliance on the market-based information co-evolve. Each modulates the other to maintain balance so that the magnitude of the market's error in pricing remains stable as the other parameters in the model continue to converge. Figure 1 Fixed point values of ) ( 
